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(On Second Hearin,g .)
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No. 35286.
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
EN BANC.
MAY TERM, 1939.
STATE EX REL. LLOYD L. GAINES,
APPELLANT ,

vs.
S. W. CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, AND THE CURATORS
OF THE UNIVERSIT Y OF MISSOURI, A BODY
CORPORATE , RESPONDEN TS.
RESP0 NDENT S' BRIEF.
1

1

(On Se co nd Hearing.*)
1

1

RESP·ONDENTS' STATEMENT.

(Figures in parentheses indicate pages in appellant's abstract.)
This is a suit in mandamus to compel the registrar and :..the curators of the University of Missouri
*To meet the changed status of this case effected by
the recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232) and the recent amendment
of the Lincoln University Act, respondents submit this
brief in lieu of their brief on the former hearing.
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to admit relator, a negro, as a student in the School
of Law in the University of Missouri. Relator alleges that by the respondents' refusal to admit
him he is denied the equal protection of the laws
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution (21-22). The circuit court
found the issues and rendered judgment in favor
of respondents, quashing the alternative writ and
denying a permanent writ (53-54).
In its former opinion (342 Mo. 121, 113 S. W.
(2d) 783) this court held that it is the law and established public policy of Missouri to segregate the
white and negro races for the purpose of higher
education; that the provision made for out-of-state
education of negro citizens by Section 9622, R. S.
1929, afforded to relator substantially equal opportunity to gain a legal education, and that his rights
under the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Federal Constitution were therefore not
denied.
On certiorari the Supreme Co-u rt of the United
States held, by a divided opinion, that relator is
entitled to substantially equal facilities for legal
education within the borrders of the State; that the
provision in old Section 9622 for out-of-state instruction did not satisfy this constitutiona l right;
and that relater is entitled to be admitted to the
Law School of the University of Missouri ''in the
absence of other and proper provision for his legal
training within the State." The case was remanded
to this co11rt for further proceedings not inconsist·e nt with that holding (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232).
Since that decision the General Assembly of
Missouri has made ''other and proper provision for

3

relator's legal training within the State." House
Bill No. 195, duly passed by the General Assembly,
approved and signed by the governor on May 4,
1939 and now on file in the office of the secretary
of state, reads as follows:
·

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Missouri, as follows:
"Section 1. That Section 9618 and Section
9622 of Article 19 of Chapter 57 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri for the year 1929 are hereby repealed and there is hereby enacted in lieu
thereof two new sections to be known as Section 9618 and Section 9622 to read as follows:
"Section 9618. The Board of Curators of
the Lincoln University shall be authorized and
required to reorganize said institution so that
it shall afford to the negro people of the state
opportunity for training up to the standard furnished at the State University of Missouri. To
this end the board of curators shall be authorized to purchase necessary additional land, erect
necessary additional buildings, to open and establish any new school, department or course
of instruction, to provide necessary additional
equipment, and to locate the respective units
of the university wherever in the State of Missouri in their opinion the various schools will
most effectively promote the .purposes of this
article.
''Section 9622. Pending the full development of the Lincoln University, the Board of
Curators shall have the authority, if and when
any qualified negro resident so requests, to arrange for his attendance at a college or university in some other state to take any course

4

or to study any subjects provided for at the
State University of Missouri, and which are
not taught at the Lincoln University, and to
pay the reasonable tuition fees for such attendance ..
"Section 2. Since the Supreme Court of
the United States has recently decided that the
State of Missouri has not adequately provided
for the adequate training in institutions of
higher education in the State of Missouri for
negro residents of the State, and there are a
number of persons of the negro race in this
State now requesting higher education, the legislature declares that an emergency has been
created and exists within the meaning of the
consti"bution of this State, and this act shall be
in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.
"Section 3. The General Assembly hereby
determines that this bill is a revision bill
within the meaning of Section 41 of Article
4 of the Constitution of Missouri."*
The House of Representatives of the General
Assembly has also passed, and there is now pending in the Senate, house bill No. 584, carrying an
appropriation for Lincoln University (in addition
to $535,000.00 for other purposes) of the additional
sum of $200,000.00 "for the use of the Board of
Curators of Lincoln University in employing additional teachers and instructors and the purchases
of necessary equipment for the purpose of opening
new departments, so as to comply with the provisions of Section 9618 of the Revised Statutes of
• All italics in all quotations in this brief are ours.
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Missouri as amended by the Laws of Missouri,
1939." This bill will undoubtedly become a law
before a decision of this case is reached.
Our position is that the case is now before this
court for consideration of two fundamental questions, neither of which is foreclosed by the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States. These
questions are (a) as to the effect of the new law,
and (b) as to relator's right, independently of the
new law, to appeal to the discretion of this court to
grant mandamus.
The facts disclosed by the record are as
follows:
Relater, 27 years of age, a native of Mississippi,
came to Missouri twelve years ago, and has received
his education in free public schools maintained by
this state for the education of negroes, including
education in common school, high school and Lincoln University. He was graduated from the latter
institution in August, 1935, with an A. B. degre-e
(57, 78-79). He thereupon made application for
admission as a student in the School of Law in the
University of Missouri, and later filed with the
registrar a transcript of his credits as a student in
Lincoln University (60-·6 1, 64). Relator's communication with the registrar was entirely by correspondence, and until he filed the transcript of his
credits from Lincoln University there was nothing
in the correspondence to apprise the registrar that
relator was a negro (60).
Upon the filing of th·e transcript from Lincoln
University it became obvious to the registrar that
rel'ator must be a negro. Thereup.o n the registrar
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telegraphed relator suggesting that he communicate with President Florence of Lincoln University
regarding arrangements for his legal education
(65). President Florence wrote relator calling his
attention to the then existing Lincoln University
Act (73).
Relator admits that he was fully advised of
the provisions made for his benefit by the then
existing Lincoln University Act, and that he fully
understood his rights under that act. He says that
after full consideration he deliberately refused to
avail himself of such rights (74, 82, 83, 84). He
testifies that within two days after he received
President Florence's letter, he got in communication with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (82), and discussed
his rights with the counsel for that association (84),
who advised him to refuse to avail himself of the
rights provided for him by the Lincoln University Act, and to ''keep on corresponding with Missouri University" (84).
Relator testifies that before he began his efforts to force his way into Missouri University he
investigated the law· courses offered at Missouri University, Iowa University and Illinois University (86), and "after co~paring the catalogs, or
rather the courses of studies offered, I decided that
Missouri U. would give me more largely what
I wanted than any other colleges under consideration" (59). Yet he admits that at the time
he made this election he knew nothing whatever
as to the system of instruction at any of these
schools-whether they used the casebook system,
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the textbook system, the lecture system or what
system (86-87).
In a deposition taken before trial relator was
asked whether, if a good law school was established at Lincoln University on a par with the one
at Missouri University, he would attend it; and
on the advice of his counsel relator refused to answer this question ( 88-89).
Relator admits that he has refused to avail
himself of any of the rights provided for him by
the Lincoln University Act of 1921 (85-86), and
has never made application to Lincoln University
for a legal education (85-86, 136-137).
There has never been any demand upon Lincoln University by any negro for a legal education
(136-137). Consequently no school of law had
been established in that institution (77).
A law school in Lincoln University could be
established and operated for a small class, on a
level of scholarship and training equal to that in
Missouri University Law School, for a maximum of
$10,000.00 per year (185-186). A student in a
small class would receive more intensive training
than a student would receive in a class of 30 to 50
students, and would practically have the advantage
of a private tutor (186). If relater were admitted
as a student in the Missouri University Law
School, and were taught in a separate class from
the white students in accordance with the public
policy and tradition of the state, the expense to
the state would be as great as it would be to establish a law school in Lincoln University (186).
Th.e record shows that the State of Missouri is
a pioneer among the states in the field of higher
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education for negroes, and is the only state in the
Union which has established a separate university
for negroes on the same basis as the State University for white students (138). Dr. J. D. Elliff
testified that during the five years of his incumbency as chairman of the board of curators of Lincoln University, the General Assembly always gave
Lincoln University substantially all the money requested by its board for maintenance, operation, expansion and general purposes (137). From 1921 to
1937, inclusive, the state appropriated to Lincoln University sums aggregating $4,057,653.49.*
From this total $500,000.00 was eliminated by the
decision of this court in Lincoln University v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118, so the net balance appropriated
in those years was $3,557,653.49. To this will be
added the very substantial sums included in the
current appropriation bill.
The unexpended balances in the Lincoln University funds were $311,061.74 on August 9, 1935,
the date when relater was graduated from Lincoln
University and was ready to begin his legal education_ (8); $298,620.16 on September 6, 1935, the
date when the University of Missouri and Lincoln
University respectively began their fall semesters;
and $159,870.73 on April 17, 1936, when this suit
was filed (147).
While relator's counsel in their brief speak
disparagingly of Lincoln University, the relator
himself, who received his academic education
*Laws, 1921, pp. 65, 87, 101; Laws, 1923, pp. 51, 60, 96;
Laws, 1925, pp. 57, 78; Laws, 1927, p. 88; Laws, 1929, pp.
24, 101; Laws, 1931, p. 46; Laws, 1933, pp. 124, 130; Laws1
1935, p. 66; Laws, 1937, p. 72.
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there, admits that Lincoln University is a wellmanaged, well-conducted university, on a plane
with the University of Missouri as far as he knows
( 79-80, 80-81).
The testimony of Mr. C. B. Rollins (169-170),
Judge North Todd Gentry (171-172) and Senator
F. M. McDavid (174-184) is to the effect that no
negro has ever attended or been received as a student in the University of Missouri; that no negro
except relator has ever applied for admission as
a student; and that it has always been the public policy of the state to provide separate educational systems for negroes and whites.
Relator admits that he understood it to be
the public policy, law and Constitution of Missouri
to separate negro and white children for the purposes
of education (81) . He admits he knew that Lincoln University was established for negroes and
the University of Missouri was established for
whites (81); yet with this knowledge and in defiance of the settled policy and tradition of the state,
he refused to apply to Lincoln University, and chose
to apply to the University of Missouri (82).
The curators of the ·university of Missouri
rejected his application by a resolution based upon
the public policy and laws of the state, a copy of
which resoluton was by the registrar furnished to
relator (70-71).
Senator F. M. McDavid, president of the board
of curators, testified that in rejecting relator's
application the board of curators acted from no other
motive or reason than a desire to obey what it
conceived to be the mandate of the constitution,
the law and the public policy of the state, requiring
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separation of the races for the purpose of education
{175-176); that the board as such has never had
any policy on this subject, and never had any occasion to formulate any policy until relater attempted to gain admission; and that when for
the first time in the history of the institution a
negro (relator) applied for admission, the board
acted on what it conceived to be its duty under
the law (176).
Senator McDavid further testified that the admission of negroes into the University of Missouri
would create a great amount of trouble, and would
make discipline very difficult; that every student
and every citizen knows the traditions of this state
and of the university, running through a hundred
years, respecting this matter; and that to admit a
negro into the University of Missouri would be
subversive of discipline, which is a matter of very
great importance; and that this feature also was
taken into consideration by the board in ruling on
relator's application (177).
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P '0 INT'S AND AUTHORITIES.
1

I.

All questio,ns not de·c ide·d by the Supreme .
Court of the United States are left open for decision by this court upon. this1 hearing.
1

1

Ex parte Union Steamboat Company, 178

u. s.

317, 319.

In re Sanford Fork & Tool Company) 160
U. S. 247, 256.
Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co.J 153 U. S.
361.

Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Slattery, (7 C. C. A.) 102 F. (2d) 58, 64.

II.
This co,urt will give effect to1 the amendment
of the Lincoln Unive·r sity Act, enacted pending
the appeal

Simpson v. Stoddard County, 173 Mo. 421.,
476.
Totten v. James) 5-5 Mo. 494.
Hubbard v. Gilpin, 57 Mo. 441.
Pugh v. McCormick, 14 Wall. 361.

United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1
Cran.ch 103.

Duplex Company v. Dearing, 254 U. S.
1. C. 464.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge Co., 18 Howard 421, 431-432.
Texas Comp any v. Brown, 258 ·U. S. 466,
1

474.

Townley v. Scarborough, 91 Miss . 584.
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In re Stickney's Estate, 77 N. E. 993.
Densmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U.
s. 115, 120.
McCann v. Retirement Board, 331 Ill. 193,
162 N. E. 859.
Merlo v. Johnson City and Big Muddy Coal
& Mining Co., 258 Ill. 328.
Home Savings & Loan Associatio•n v. Plass,
57 F. (2d) 117.
This court will take judicial notice of the
amendment of Section 9618, R. S., 1929, and of the
status of the pending appropriation bill to provide
money for new departments in Lincoln University.
State ex rel. Karbe v. Bader, 336 Mo. 259,
266, 78 S. W. (2d) 835.
State v. Adams, 323 Mo. 729, 19 S. W. (2d)
671, 673.
Utz v. Dormann, 328 Mo. 258, 39 S. W. (2d)
1053, 1055.
Bowen v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 118 Mo.
541.
Gibson v. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co.,
225 Mo. 473.
Sho,h oney v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R. Co . ,
231 Mo. 131.

III.
The Lincoln University Act, as amended, gives
relator equal p•ro,t e,c tion; and mandamus should be
de·n ie,d as a matte·r of right.
1. The laws and long-established public policy of the state require separation of the white
and negro races for purposes of higher education,
State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo,
121, 130-131, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 7869
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State of Missouri v. Canada, 59 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 232, 234.
2. In providing the facilities for higher education the state has the undoubted right to separate the races.
State of Missouri v. Canada, 59 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 232, 234.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 544, 16
S. Ct. 1138, 1140, 41 L. Ed. 256.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Rwy. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 160, 35 S. Ct.
69, 70, 59 L. Ed. 169.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 85, 86,
48 S. Ct. 91, 93, 72 L. Ed. 172.
Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S.
528, 544, 545, 20 S. Ct. 197, 200, 33 L.
Ed. 262.
3. The Lincoln University Act (~s now
amended) makes proper provision for relator's legal
training within the borders of the state and provides
for him an opportunity for legal instruction equal
to that available to whites at the University of
Missouri.
House bill No. · 195, duly passed by . the
General Assembly, approved and
signed by the governor on May 4,
1939, now on file in th-e office of the
secretary of state.
Th.e duty imposed by this amended act is unquestionably mandatory.
Lincoln University v. Hackmann, 295 Mo.
118, 124. · .
.
State ex rel. GaiMs v. Canada, 342 Mo.
121, 113 S . W. (2d) 783, 7.91.
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4. The law presumes that the Lincoln University curators will perform their legal duty to establish a school of law in that institution equal to
the one in the University of Missouri.
State ex rel. Murphy v. Burney, 269 Mo.
602, 611, 191 S. W. 981, 983.
Curtin v. Zerbst Ph.a rmaeal Co., 333 Mo.
346, 349, 62 S. W. (2d) 771, 772.

Little Prairie Special Road District v. Pemiscot County, 297 Mo. 568, 576, 249 S.

w. 599, 601.

State ex rel. Clinton Const. Co. v. Johnston,.
272

s. w. 928, 931.

State ex rel. Hiemburger v. Wells, 210 Mo.
601, 615, 109 S. W. 758.
Otto v. Young, 227 Mo. 193, 218, 127 S. W. 9.
Hall v. Geiger-Jomes Company, 242 U. S.
539, 554.

Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 263 U. S. 394, 398.
Utah Power & Light Co v. Pfo,st, 286 U ..
S. 165, 190.
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Co•r poration Commission of Virginia, 236
u. s. 699, 701.
Plymouth Coal Co·. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 545.
Bradley v. Richmo1id, 227 U. S. 477, 483.
1
•

5. Relator has a plain administrative remedy
under Section 9618, as amended; and he is not entitled to mandamus unless and until he exhausts:
that remedy.
State ex rel. v. Seib·e rt, 130 Mo. 202, 222 ..

State ex rel. Onion v. S.upreme Tent Pythian SisteTs, 54 S. W. (2d) 468, 470.

State ex rel. Camm ann v. Tower Grove
Turnve rein, 206 S. W. 242, 243.
State ex rel. v. Wenom , (Mo. Sup.) 32
S. W. (2d) 59.
State ex rel. v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254
Mo. 515, 163 S. W. 854.
State ex reI. Nick v. Edwar ds et al., 260
S. W. 454 (S. Ct. en bane).
State v. Cape Girard eau County Court, 109
Mo. 248.
State ex rel. v. Smith, 48 S. W. (2d )891.
State ex rel. v. Hudson , 226 Mo. 239, 265266 ..

State ex rel. v. Bank- of Concep tion, 174
Mo. App. 589_, 593.
Myers v. Bethle hem Shipbu ilding Corporation, 303 U. S. 41, 50-51, 58 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 459, 463.
Highla nd Farms Dairy v. Agnew , 300 U. S.
608, 616-617~
Petrol eum Explor ation, In~., v. Public Service Commissio1i, 304 U. S. 209, 222-3,

58 Sup. Ct. Rep. 834, 841.
Bourjo is, Inc., v. Chapm an, 301 U . S. 183,
188.

Natura l Gas Co. v. :S lattery , 302 U. S. 300,
309.

Goldsm ith v. B-oard of Tax Appeal s, 270
u. s. 117, 123.
Gundl ing v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186 .
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 561-2.
Porter v. Investo rs' Syndic ate, 286 U. s_
461, 468, 471.
.
Lehan v. City of Atlanta , 242 U. S. 53, 55-6..
Leiber man v . Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 5.521
562.
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Ex parte Virginia Commissioners, 112 U.
s. 177.
6. If relator should request the Lincoln University curators to give him legal instruction, and
they should refuse or ignore his request, relator
would have a clear right by mandamus to compel
them to perform their duty.
Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S.
528, 545.
School District v. Hunnicutt., 51 F. (2d)
528, 529.
Board of Education v. Excise Board, 86 Okla.
24, 206 Pac. 517, 521.
State ex rel. Morehead v. Cartwright, 122
. Mo. App. 257.
Black v. Lenderman, 156 Ark. 476, 246 S.
w. 876.
Jones v. Board of Education of City of Muskogee., 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400.
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 363-4.

7. Substantial equality and not identity of
school facilities is what is guaranteed by the equal
protection clause.
State of Missouri v. Canada, 59 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 232, 237.
State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo.
121, . 134, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 789.
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y.
438, 449, 455.

State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio
St. 198, 211.
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 362, 363.
State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio
State University, 126 Ohio St. 290, 297.
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Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381, 382.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 54, 56.
School Dist. v. Hunnicutt, 51 F. (2d) 528.
State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton., 98 Okla.
158, 224 Pac. 511, 513.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C.
33, 52 S. E. 267.
Dameron v. Bayliss, (Ariz.) 126 Pac. 273,
'275.
Daviess County Board of Educ . .v. Johnson,
(Ky.) 200 S. W. 313, 315.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84.
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio
· Dec. 129.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13
Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-162,
165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735-6.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161
N. Y. 598, 48 L. R. A. 113.
8. The General Assembly is to be allowed a
large measure of discretion in determining the particular school facilities to be used by each race;
and the courts •will not interfere with the exercise
of that discretion except in case of a very clear
and unmistakable disregard of constitutional rights.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 550.
Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S.
528, 545.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C.
33, 52 S. E. 267, 270.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 54-56.
State ex rel. v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198, 2045, 211-12.
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People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y.
438, 456.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton., (N. Y.) 13
Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-163.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
IV.
. Re,Iator has not been de·n ied due pro,cess of
law.
1

Waugh v. Trustees of the University of
Mississippi, 237 U. S. 589.
State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo.
121, 134, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 788-9 .
.The decision of this point by this court on the
former submission was not challenged by the Supreme Court of the United States, and is therefore
foreclosed.
State of Missouri v. Canada, 59 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 232.

V.
Mandamus is a discretionary remedy, and no,t
a writ of right; and under all the circumstances of
this ca:s e the exercise, of a so,und judicial dis.cretion
requires that the writ should be denie·d.

This question was not decided by this court on
the former hearing, and is open for decision now.
·s tate ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo.
121, 113 S. W. (2d) 783.
State of Missouri v. Canada, 59 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 232, 237, and see dissenting opinion (l. c. 238) .
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The question as to the propriety of the remedy
is a local and not a federal question, and is not
reviewab le by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Farson., Son & Co. v. Bird, 248 U. S. 268,
271.
People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U. S.
590, 592.
Yesler v. Washing ton Harbor Line Commissione rs, 146 U. S. 646, 657.
The question whether mandam us will issue is
one of discretio n, and in exercisin g the discretio n
the court will consider whether the issuance of the
writ might bring about confusion and dis_o rder, or
be otherwis e opposed to the public interest.
State ex rel. Jacobsm eyer v. Thatcher , 338
Mo. 622, 627, 92 S. W. (2d) 640.
State ex rel. Crow v. Boonville Bridge Co.,
206 Mo. 74, 134-135.
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Kansas
City, St. Jo seph ·and Council Bluffs
R. R. Co., 77 Mo. 143, 147.
State ex inf. Barker v. Kansas City Ga.s
Co., 254 Mo. 515, 531, 541.
Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S.
308, 311.
Arant v. Lane, 249 U. S. 367, 371.
State ex rel. Burnett v. School District of
City of Jeff er son, 335 Mo. 803, 815;
74 S. W. (2d) 30, 34.
State ex rel. Lyons v. · Bank, 174 Mo. App.
589, 593, 595.
1

Social equality cannot be coerced by law.
Plessy v., Ferguson , 163 U. S. 537, 551.
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Peopl e ex rel. King v. Galla gher, 93 N. Y.
438, 448.

State ex rel. Weav er v. Trust ees of Ohio
State Univ ersity , 126 Ohio St. 290,
297.
Lehe w v. Brum mell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-2.
Youn ger v. Judah , 111 Mo. 303, 311~312.
Mart in v. Board of Educ ation , (W. Va.) 26
S. E. 348, 349.
Robe rts v. City of Bosto n, 5 Cush. 198,
210.
Ward v. Flood , 48 Calif. 36.
The relato r, unde r the facts in this recor d, is
not in a positi on to appea l to the discre tion of

this court .
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ARGU MEN T.

I.

All quest ions not de,c ided by the: Supre me
Court o,f the Unite d State s are left open for decisio,n by this court upon this he·arin.g.

The Supre me Cour t of the Unite d States , of
co.urse, could not and did not consi der or decid e
the effect of the provi sion now made by the State
of Misso uri for the highe r educa tion of negro es, because the prese nt law had not been enact ed when
the cause was decid ed by that court.
Nor did that court
tion as to the propr iety
of mand amus . In the
said (59 Sup. Ct. Rep.

attem pt to decid e the quesof the discre tionar y remed y
major ity opinio n the court
232, 237):

''We do not find that the decisi on of the
state court turns on any proce dural quest ion."
In their disse nting opini on the disse nting justic es
said (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 238):
"Man damu s is not a writ of right but is
grant ed only in the court 's discre tion upon
consi derati on of all the circum stanc es. Dunc an
Town site Comp any v. Lane, Secre tary of the
Interi or, 245 U. S. 308, 311, 38 S. Ct. 99, 100,
62 L. Ed. 309; Unite d State s ex rel. Aran t v.
Lane, Secre tary of the Interi or, 249 U. S. 367,
371, 39 S. Ct. 293, 294, 63 L. Ed. 650.
"The Supre me Court of Misso uri did not
consi der the propr iety of grant ing the writ under the theor y of the law now accep ted here.
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That, of course, will be matter open for its
consideration upon return of the cause."
So it is apparent . that the two fundamental
questions which we now present (as to the effect of
the new law, and as to the propriety of mandamus)
are left open for decision by this court. It is the
settled rule that all questions left open by the
opinion and mandate of a reviewing court may be
considered and determined by the lower court upon
a remand of the cause (Ex Parte Union Steamboat
Comp,a ny, 178 U. S. 317, 319; In re Sanforrd Fork
& Tool Comp,a ny, 160 U. S. 247, 256; Mason. v.
Pewabic Mining Co., 153 U. S. 361; Illinois Bell
Telephone Company v. Slattery, (7 C. C. A.) 102
F. (2d) 58, 64).

II.
This co,u rt will give effect to the amendment
of the Lincoln University Act, enacted p.e,n ding
the appe·al.

It is well settled that where relief sought is
to operate in futuro (as here), a change in the
law pending appeal must be given effect by the
appellate court in determining the appeal.
In Simpson v. Stoddard County·, 173 Mo. 421,
476, plaintiff brought an action to quiet title to
swamp land claimed under proceedings concededly
defective under the law as it existed at the time
of the trial. There was judgment for the plaintiff,
and pending the appeal of the .defendant a statute
was passed which validated the proceeding. This
court en bane gave effect to the validating statute,
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quoting with approval from the opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall in United States v. The Scho on.er
Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, as follows:
1

"It is in general true that the province of
an appellate court is only to inquire whether a
judgment when rendered is erroneous or not.
But if subsequent to the judgment, and before
the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes, and positively changes the rule which
governs, the law must be obeyed, if it is obligatory.''
This court in the Simpson case said that''We see no valid reason why the court, if
it finds a law intervening subsequent to the
judgment changing the rule as applicable to
that judgment, could not apply it. If this Act
of 1901 is the law of the land, then we can apply
it in support of the judgment of the lower court.
Certainly, it will not be disputed that if this
act is obligatory and if this case was reversed,
we could require the trial court to enforce it.
If we have the power upon reversal to say
to the lower court that this statute is iri force
and entitles the respondents to a judgment,
we ha.v e the right to do directly what we
could do indirectly.''
The principle thus announced by this court
en bane in the Simpson case has been uniformly
applied by this court, and by the Supreme Court
of the United States and other courts, in the following cases:
Totten v. James, 55 Mo. 494.
Hubbard v. Gilpin, 57 Mo. 441.
Pugh v. McCormick, 14 Wall. 361.

24

United States v. The Scho·o ner Peggy, 1
Cranch 103.
Duplex Company v. Dearing, 254 U. S. 1.
c. 464.
Pennsylvani a v. Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge Co., 18 Howard 421, 431-432.
Texas Comp·a ny v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466,
474.
Townley v. Scarborough , 91 Miss. 584.
In re Stickney's Estate, 77 N. E. 993.
Densmore v. Southern Express Co·., 183 U.
S. 115, 120.
McCann v. Retirement Board, 331 Ill. 193,
162 N. E. 859.
Merlo v. Johnson City and Big Mudd.y
Coal & Mining Co., 258 Ill. 328.
Home Savings & Lo,a n Asso·c iation v. PLass,
57 F. (2d) 117.
If the judgment in this case were reversed
and the cause remanded for a new trial in the Circuit Court of Boone County, the judge of that court
on a new trial would necessarily be compelled
to give effect to the provisions of Section 9618 as
now amended. This because the relief sought by
the relator, if granted, would operate in futuro.
(The earliest date at which relator could possibly
be admitted as a student in either the University of
Missouri or Lincoln University would be at the opening of the September, 1939, semester.) Under the
principle established by the foregoing cases, this
court can take notice of the amendment, and can
do directly what the Circuit Court of Boone County
on a new trial would be compelled to do-that is,
give full force and effect to the provision now made
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for relator's legal education within the borders of
the State.
Under a well-settled principle this court will
take judicial notice of all acts and proceedings of
the General Assembly. So the court takes notice of
the amendment of Section 9618, and of the status of
the appropriation bill to provide the money for new
departments in Lincoln University (State ex rel.
Karbe v. Bader, 336 Mo. 259, 266, 78 S. W. (2d)
835; State v. Adams, 323 Mo. 729, 19 S. W. (2d) 671,
673; Utz v. Dorrmann, 328 Mo. 258, 39 S. W. (2d)
1053, 1055; Bowen v. Missouri P·a cific Ry. Co., 118
Mo. 541; Gibson v. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co.,
225 Mo. 473; Shohoney v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R.
R. Co., 231 Mo. 131).

III.
The L inco ln University Act, as amended, gives
re1lato r e·q ual pro tection; and mandamus should be
de,n ie,d as a matter of right.
1

1

1

1

1. The laws and the long established public
policy of the State of Missouri require that the
higher education of whites and negroes be provided for in separate universities. After an exhaustive review of the subject this court in its former opinion said (342 Mo. 121, 130-131, 113 S. W.
{2d) 783, 786):
"All of the foregoing statutes show a clear
intention on the part of the legislature to separate the white and negro races for the purpose
of higher education. The provisions of the
1921 Lincoln University Act, if it stood alone,
would leave no doubt on that subject. Sections 3 and 7 of that Act (now Secs. 9618 and
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9622, R. S., 1929 (Mo. St. Ann., Secs. 9618,
9622, pp. 7327, 7328)) are couched in language
too plain to be misunde rstood.
"The provisio ns of Section 9618 evidence
a clear intention on the part of the legislatu re
to give to the negro and white people of the
State equal opportun ity for higher educatio n,
but in separate schools. Why provide by Section 9618 that Lincoln Universi ty, a negro
school, should be reorgani zed so that it would
afford the negro people of the State opportunity for training up to the standard furnishe d
at the Universi ty of Missouri , if the negroes
already had, or if the legislatu re intended
they should have, the opportun ity for training
at the Universi ty of Missouri by becomin g a
student therein? The answer is obvious. It
is clear that the legislatu re intended to bring
the Lincoln Univers ity up to the standard of
the Universi ty of Missouri , and give to the
whites and negroes an equal opportun ity for
higher educatio n-the whites at the Universi ty
of Missouri , and the negroes at Lincoln University.
"The provision s of Section 9622 to the effect that negro residents of this State may attend the universi ty of any adjacent state
with their tuition paid, pending the full development of Lincoln Universi ty, makes it clear
that the legislatu re did not intend that negroes
and whites should attend the same universi ty
in this State."
That part of this court's opinion was approved
and followed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the followin g language (59 Sup. Ct. Rep.
232, 234):
"The clear and definite conclusio ns of the
state court in construi ng the· pertinen t state
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legislation narrow the issue. The action of the
curators, who are representatives of the State
in the management of the state university (R.
S. Mo., Sec. 9625, Mo. St. Ann., Sec. 9625, p.
7330), must be regarded as state action. The
state constitution provides that separate free
public schools shall be established for the education of children of African descent (Art. II,
Sec. 3, Mo. St. Ann., Const., Art. II, Sec. 3),
and by statute separate high school facilities
are supplied for colored students equal to those
provided for white students (R. S. Mo., Secs.
9346-9349, Mo. St. Ann., Secs. 9346-9349, pp.
7183-7187). While there is no express constitutional provision requiring that the white
and negro races be separated for the purpose of
higher education, the state court on a comprehensive review of the state statutes held that
it was intended to separate the white and negro races for that purpose also. Referring in
particular to Lincoln University, the court
deemed it to be clear 'that the legislature intended to bring the Lincoln University up to
the standard of the University of Missouri, and
give to the whites and negroes an equal opportunity for higher education-the whites at the
University of Missouri, and the negroes at Lincoln University.' 113 S. W. (2d) 787. Further, the court concluded that the provisions
of Section 9622 (above quoted) to the ·effect
that negro residents 'may attend the university
of any adjacent state with their tuition paid,
pending the full development of Lincoln University,' made it evident 'that the legislature
did not intend that negroes and whites should
attend the same university in this State.' In
that view it necessarily followed that the curators of the University of Missouri acted in accordance with the policy of the State in deny-
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ing petitioner admissi_o n to its School of Law
upon the sole ground of his race."
2. In providing the facilities for higher education the State has the undoubted right to separate the white and negro races. This is expressly
conceded in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States, as follows (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232,
234):

"In answering petitioner's contention that
this discrimination constituted a denial of his
constitutional right, the state court has fully
recognized the obligation of. the State to provide negroes with advantages for higher education substantially equal to the advantages afforded the white students. The State has
sought to fulfill that obligation by furnishing
equal facilities in separate schools, a metho d
the validity of which has been sustained by
our decisions. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537, 544, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 1140, 41 L. Ed. 256;
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rwy.
Co., 235 U. S. 151, 160, 35 S. Ct. 69, 70, 59
L. Ed. 169; Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78,
85, 86, 48 S. Ct. 91, 93, 72 L. Ed. 172. Compare
Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528,
544, 545, 20 S. Ct. 197, 200, 33 L. Ed. 262."
1

3. We respectfully contend that by the Lincoln University Act (as now amended) the State
of Missouri has provided for relator, within the
borders of the State, an opportunity for legal instruction equal to that available to whites, and has
thereby fully satisfied relator's constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws, as defined in the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Lincoln University Act, as amended, provides for higher education of negroes up to the
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standard available at the University of Missouri.
The control of Lincoln University is vested in a
board of curators, which board is required to organize after the manner of the board of curators of
the state university, with the same powers, authority, responsibiliti es, privileges, immunities, liabilities and compensation as those prescribed for the
board of curators for the University of Missouri
(Sec. 9621, R. S., 1929).
Section 9618, R. S., 1929, as it stood before the recent amendment, vested in the Lincoln curators some discretion in the matter of
equalizing its facilities with those of the University of Missouri. Because of that discretion the
Supreme Court of the United States said (59 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 232, 235-236):
"The state court has not held that it would
have b~en the duty of the curators to establish
a law school at Lincoln University for the petitioner on his application. Their duty, ·as the
court defined it, would have been either to
supply a law school at Lincoln University as
provided in ·s ection 9618 or to furnish him the
opportunity to obtain his legal training in another state as provided in Section 9622. Thus
the law left the curators free to adopt the latter
course. The state court has not ruled or intimated that their failure or refusal to establish a law school for a very few students, still
less for one student, would have been an abuse
of the discretion with which the curators were
entrusted. And, apparently, it was because of
tha~ discretion, and of the postponemen t which
its exercise in accordance with the terms of
the statute would entail until necessity and
practicability appeared, that the state court
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considered and upheld as adequate the provision for the legal education of negroes, who
were citizens of Missouri, in the universities
of adjacent states.''
In order to meet that defect, the General Assembly amended Section 9618, so that now the Lincoln board is unconditiona lly and unqualifiedl y
"required to reorganize said institution so that it
shall afford to the negro people of the State opportunity for training up to the standard furnished
at the State University of Missouri." The discr-etion vested in the bo,a r,d by the former law has
been removed. Said Section 9618, as amended, now
reads as fallows:
''Section 9618. The board of curators of
the Lincoln University sh.a ll be authorized and
required to reorganize said institution so that
it shall afford to the negro people of the State
opportunity for training up to the st,andard
furnished at the State Univ.ersity of Missouri.
To this end the board of_curators shall be authorized to purchase necessary additional land,
erect necessary additional buildings, to open
and establish any new school, department or
course of instruction, to provide necessary ad~
ditional equipment, and to locate the respective
units of the university wherever in the State
of Missouri in their opinion the various schools
will most effectively promote the purposes of
this article.''
The duty now imposed upon the Lincoln University curators by this amended act is unquestionably mandatory (Lincoln University v. Hackmann, 295 Mo. 118, 124; State ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 342 Mo. 121, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 791).
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Under this act the Lincoln University board is unconditionally required to open new departments in
Lincoln University, in order to make available for
negro residents of the State, in that institution,
courses of study (including the law) available to
white citizens at the University of Missouri. Thus
every constitutional right of relator is protected .
The relator says he wants an education in the
law.. He is unquestionably entitled to receive it,
in a state institution located within the borders of
the State (59 Sup. Ct . Rep. 232). The State has
now made provision for him to receive such education in such an institution, and has plainly
marked out the course for him to pursue in order
to get it. The agency of the State now specifically
charged with the mandatory duty to furnish him
what he seeks is the board of curators of Lincoln
University. It is not the board of curators of the
University of Missouri.
In its opinion the Supreme Court of the United
States said that "the provision for legal education at Lincoln is at present entirely lacking" (59
Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 235). That objection can no
longer be made.
The Supreme Court said that the duty of the
Lincoln curators under Section 9618, Revised Statutes, 1929, was "either to supply a law school at
Lincoln University as provided in Section 9618 or
to furnish him the opportunity to obtain his legal
training in another state as provided in Section
9622" (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 235). That can not
now be said to be the provision of Section 9618 as
amended. The duty under the amended section is,
without qualification, to open new departments at
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Lincoln Universi ty. While Section 9622, as amended ,
still provides for out-of-st ate instructi on, it is important to note that the Lincoln curators are authorized to supply out-of-st ate instructi on only "if
and when any qualified negro resident so requests ."
(See the new law quoted in our statemen t, supra)
Under Section 9618, as amended , any negro resident of Missouri desiring legal instructi on can obtain it in Lincoln Universi ty.
The Supreme Court said that "the white resident is afforded legal educatio n within the state;
the negro resident having the same qualifica tions
is refused it there and must go outside the state
to obtain it" (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 236). That objection can no longer be made. If relator desires
a legal educatio n, he may have it, within the
borders o,j the State.
The Supreme Court said that "the obligatio n
of the State to give the protectio n of equal laws
can be performe d only where its laws operate, that
is, within its own jurisdict ion. It is there that
the equality of legal right must be maintain ed"
(59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 236). The amendm ent of
Section 9618 fully accords with this principle .
The Supreme Court said that the obligatio n of
the state to give equal protectio n was one ''the burden of which cannot be cast by one state upon another, and no state can be excused from performance by what another state may do or fail to do'~
(59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 237). That statemen t of
the- court has now been fully met by the amendment of Section 9618 ..
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The Suprem e Court said:
"Nor can we regard the fact that there is
but a limited deman d in Missou ri for the legal
educat ion of negroe s as excusin g the discrimin ation in favor of whites . * * * Here,
petitio ner's right was a person al one. It was
as an individ ual that he was entitle d to the
equal protec tion of the laws, and the State was
bound to furnish him within its border s facilities for legal educat ion substa ntially equal
to those which the state there afforde d for persons of the white race, whethe r or not other
negroe s sought the same opport unity" (59 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 232, 237).
The amend ment of Section 9618 fully accords with
this princip le, and entitle s the relator , even though
he is the only negro residen t desirin g a legal education, to receive such educat ion within the borders of the state, and within the walls of Lincol n
Univer sity.
The Suprem e Court summa rized its holding in
the follow ing langua ge (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 238):
''We are of the opinio n that the ruling was
error, and that petitio ner was entitle d to be
admitt ed to the Law School of the State University in the absenc e of other and proper provision for his legal trainin g within the State."
The State has now made "other and proper provision for his legal trainin g within the State," and
has fully satisfie d relator 's constit utional right as
defined by the Suprem e Court of the United States.
4. The law presum es that the Lincol n Univer sity board will perfor m its legal duty to establi sh
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a school of law in that institution equal to the one
in the University of Missouri. This is but the application of the general principle that the law presumes that a public officer charged with the performance of a certain duty will perform that duty.
In State ex rel. Murp,h y v. Burney, 269 Mo. 602,
611, 191 S. W. 981, 983, this court en bane said:

"We must assume that the individual members of the Board of Police Commissioners will
honestly, properly and efficiently perform the
duties saddled upon them by statute (State
ex rel. v. Wells, supra; State ~x rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383), and which by solemn
oath they have bound themselves properly, efficiently and honestly to perform.''
Other decisions by this court to the same effect
are the following:
Curtin v. Zerbst Pharmacal Co 333 Mo.
346, 349, 62 S. W. (2d) 771, 772.
Little Prairie Special Road District v. Pemiscot County, 297 Mo. 568, 576, 249 S ..
w. 599, 601.
State ex rel. Clinton Const . Co. v. Johnston, 272 S. W. 928, 931.
State ex rel. Hiemburger v. Wells, 210 Mo ..
601, 615, 109 S. W. 758.
Otto v. Young, 227 Mo. 193, 218, 127 S. W ..
1
.. ,

9 ..

The same principle is stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the following cases:
Hall v .. Geiger-Jones Company, 242 U. S..
539, 554.
Lehmann v. State B.o ard of Public Accountancy, 263 U. S. 394, 3-98.
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Utah Power & Liglit Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S.
165, 190.

Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Commission of Virginia, 236
U. S. 699, 701.
Plymo·u th Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvan.ia, 232 U. S. 531, 545.
Bradley v. RicJimond, 227 U. S. 477, 483.
5. The relator under the provisions of Section
9618, as amended, has a plain administrative remedy-that is, by application to Lincoln University
to establish a law school and provide legal instruction for him in that institution. He is not now,
and never will be, entitled to a writ of mandamus
unless and until he exhausts the prescribed administrative remedy. This principle is established
by the following decisions:
State ex rel. v. Seibert, 130 Mo. 202, 222.
State ex rel. Onion v. Supreme Tent Pythian Sisters·, 54 S. W. (2d) 468, 470.
State ex rel. Cammann v. Tower Grove
Turnverein, 206 S. W. 242, 243.
State ex rel. v. Wenom, (Mo. Sup.) 32 S.
W. (2d) 59.
State ex rel. v. Kansas .City Gas Co., 254
Mo. 515, 163 S. W. 854.
State ex rel. Nick v. Edwards et al., 260
S. W. 454 (Sup. Ct. en bane).
State v. Cape Girardeau County Court, 109
Mo. 248.
State ex rel. v. Smith, 48 S. W. (2d) 891.
State ex rel. v. Hudson, 226 Mo. 239, 265266.
State ex rel. v. Bank of Conception, 174
Mo. App. 589, 593.
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The same principle is announced in the following
decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States:

Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporatio·n , 303 U. S. 41, 50-51, 58 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 459, 463.
Highland Farms Dairy v. Agne.w , 300 U. S.
608, 616-617.
Petroleum Exploration, Inc., v. Public Service Commission, 304 U. S. 209, 222-3,
58 Sup. Ct. Rep. 834, 841.
Bourjois, Inc., v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183,
188.
Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S .
300, 309.
Goldsm~th v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270
U. S. 117, 123.
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 186.
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 561-2.
Porter v. Investors~ Syndicate, 286 U. S.
461, 468, 471.
Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53,
55-6.
Leiberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552,
562.
Ex parte Virginia Commissioners, 112 U.
s. 177.
As tersely said by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Highland
Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 616-617:
"One who is required to take •Out a license
will not be heard to complain, in advance of application, that there is danger of refusal. Lehorn
v. Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53, 56; Smith v. Cahoon,
283 U. S. 553, 562. He should apply· and see

what happens.">
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6. The Lincoln University curators have never
declined to furnish relator a legal education. They
have never had an opportunity either to furnish or
refuse to furnish him a legal education, because he
has never applied to them.
But assuming (for the sake of argument only)
that he should make a demand on Lincoln University, and that his demand should be refused or
ignored. In such a case relator would have a clear
right to mandamus-not to compel these present
respondents to admit him to the University of Missouri-but to compel the curators of Lincoln University to establish a law school in Lincoln University and to admit him as a student therein.
Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S.
528, 545.
School District v. Hunnicutt, 51 F. (2d)
528, 529.
Board of Education v. Excise Board, 86
Okla. 24, 206 Pac. 517, 521.
State ex rel. Moreheard v. Cartwright, 122
Mo. App. 257.
Black v. Lenderman, 156 Ark. 476, 246
s. w. 876.
J o·n es v. Board of Education of City of
Muskogee, 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400.
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 363-4.
While this situation will never actually arise,
we note the point that if it should arise, relator
will have an adequate remedy.
7. Substantial equality and not identity of
school facilities is what is guaranteed by the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The essential thing relator seeks is a legal education. The State of Missouri has provided that he
shall have it, within the borders of the State. There
is provided for him the opportunity to receive in
Lincoln University an education in the law equal
in all substantial respects to that provided in the
University of Missouri Law School.
Relator's whole case is based upon the erroneous assumption that he is constitutiona lly entitled
to a legal education at a particular place, and in a
particular school. That assumption is unfounded.
The Fourteenth Amendment no more gives relator the right to attend the University of Missouri
than it gives a white student the right to attend
Lincoln University. The equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment goes no further
than to require that the facilities for education
afforded each race shall be substantially equal. The
thing required is not that the facilities be identical
(in the very same schools and classrooms) but substantially equal to the facilities offered to white
students. ·This is recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States in its opinion (59 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 232, 237), when it says that "the State was
bound to furnish him ( rela tor) within its borders
facilities for legal education substantially equal to
those which the State there afforded for persons of
the white race." This is in effect an approval of
the holding by this court that "equality and not
identity of school advantages is what the law guarantees to every citizen, white or black" (342 Mo.
121, 134, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 789). Other cases to
the same effect are the following:
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551.
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People ex rel. King ·v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y.
438, 449, 455.
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St.
198, 211.
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 362, 363.
State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio
State University, 126 Ohio St. 290,
297.
Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381, 382.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 54, 56.
School Dist. v. Hunnicutt, 51 F. (2d) 528.
State ex rel. Gumm v. Albritton, 98 Okla.
158, 224 Pac. 511, 513.
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33,
52 S. E. 267.
Dameron v. Bayliss, (Ariz.) 126 Pac. 273,
275.
Daviess County Board of Educ. v. Johnson, (Ky.) 200 S. W. 313, 315.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 84.
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio
Dec. 129.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13
Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-162,
165.
United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730, 735-6.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
People ex rel. Cisco v. School Board, 161
N. Y. 598, 48 L. R. A. 113.
8. The legislature of the State is to be allowed
a large measure of discretion in determining the
particular school facilities to be used by each race; ·
and the courts will not interfere with the exer.cise of that discretion as unconstitutio nal, except
in case of a very clear and unmistakable disregard
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of rights secured by the Constitution of the United
States.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 550, a
statute of Louisiana requiring separate accommodations on railroad trains for the white and colored
races, and forbidding any person to occupy a seat
in coaches other than the ones assigned to the race
to which he belonged, was held not in conflict
with the F,o urteenth Amendment. In the course
of the opinion the Supreme Court said:
"So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute
of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and
with respect to this there must necessarily be
a large discretion on the part of the legislature.
In determining the question of reasonableness
it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.''
In Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S.
528, 545, the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
"We may add that while all admit that
the benefits and burdens of public taxation
must be shared by citizens without discrimination against any class on account of their race,
the education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging
to the respective states, and any interference on the part of federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and un-
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mistakable disregard of rights secured by the
supreme law of the land."
Other cases to the same effect are the follow.
1ng:
Lowery v. Board of Trustees, 140 N. C. 33,
52 S. E. 267, 270
Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 54-56.
State ex rel. v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198, 2045, 211-12.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y.
438, 456.
People ex rel. Dietz v. Easton, (N. Y.) 13
Abbott's Practice (N. S.) 159, 161-163.
State ex rel. v. Gray, 93 Ind. 303, 306.
The State of Missouri, in obedience to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
this case, having made provision for the legal education of negroes in Lincoln University, on a basis equal to that provided for white citizens at the
University of Missouri, we respectfully submit that
the courts should not interfere with the provision
thus made.
9. The recent amendment of Section 9618, providing for new departments at Lincoln University,
implemented by ample appropriation, affords a complete answer to the numerous statements in relator's brief (pages 43-47), wherein relater seeks
to make it appear that Lincoln University cannot
furnish him a legal education. We deem it unnecessary now to discuss these comments in relator's
brief. They are now entirely obsolete.
10. The amendment of Section 9618 and the
appropriation also render entirely inapplicable all
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of the authorities cited in relator's brief. The
case of Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl.
570, 103 A. L. R. 706, chiefly relied upon, is obviously distinguishable, because in the Pearson
case there was no provision whatever for legal
education for the negro within the borders of
Maryland.
The cases cited by relater from Kansas, Oregon, Illinois, Iowa, Colorado, New Jersey and California are distinguishable because in none of those
states was there any basis in the law for separation
of the races for educational purposes. Indeed, in
three of those states (Iowa, Colorado and Illinois)
there was an express prohibition against race
separation for educational purposes. The California
case of Piper v. Big Pine School District, 193 Cal.
664, 226 Pac. 926, cited by relater, is distinguishable on the additional ground that California had
made no provision whatever for the education of the
Indian girl, whereas Missouri has made provision
for relator's legal education.
The case of State ex rel. v. Duffy, 7 Nev.
342, cited by relater, is directly opposed to relator's
position. In that case the Nevada court held that
a statute purporting to forbid negroes from being
admitted into public schools was unconstitutional;
yet, nevertheless, the court held that even without
a statutory grant of p•o wer "it is perfectly within
their power to send all blacks to one school, al~
whites to another; or, without multiplying words,
to make such a classification, whether based on age,
sex, race, or any other existent condition, as shall
seem to them best" (citing Van Camp v. Board
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of Education, 9 Ohio St. 406, and Roberts v. Boston,
5 Cush. 198).
At page 50 of his brief relater says that "it
has been uniformly held that in the absence of express authority by statute, a municipality, school
district or board has no authority to separate white
and colored children for educational purposes"
(citing one Kansas case and one Oregon case). It
is, to say the least, an unwarranted statement to
say that this proposition has been "uniformly"
held, in light of the following decisions which hold
that, even in the absence of express legislation
authorizing it, a school board has the inherent general power to separate the races.
Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 208-209.
Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121, 125.
State ex rel. v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342.
Relator at page 50 of his brief cites Foltz v.
Hoge, 54 Cal. 28; State v. White, 82 Ind. 278, and
Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591. These cases are
wholly inapplicable to any question involved here.
They do not involve any question of separation of
races for purposes of education, and are not even
analogous on abstract principles.
Relater cites (page 52 of Brief). Dixon v. McDonnell, 92 Mo. App. 479; Berger v. St. Louis
Stotrage & Commission Co., 136 Mo. App. 36;
Bathe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Mo. App.
87, and Menzenworth v. Metropolita'n Life Iris. Co.,
249 S. W. 113, as authority for his contention that
in this mandamus suit the burden of proof is upon
the respondents. In point of fact, none of the cases
was a mandamus suit, and none of the cases is an
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authority for the contention relator makes. The
first two cases were bailment suits, and the last
two cases were suits on insurance policies where
affirmative defenses were pleaded. It is, of course,
well settled that in a bailment suit the bailor makes
a prim,a facie case by proving delivery to the bailee
of the thing bailed in good condition and failure
to redeliver in good condition on demand; and the
duty of coming forward with evidence is upon the
bailee to explain the loss or damage. And in an
insurance case the burden of establishing an affirmative defense is unquestionably upon the insurer. Such cases have not even a remote tendency
to support relator's contention as to the burden of
proof in mandamus suits.
The rule is firmly settled in Missouri that in a
mandamus suit the burden is up·o n the relator to
prove that he has a clear legal right to the relief
sought; and this burden continues with the relator throughout.
State ex rel. v. Thatcher., 338 Mo. 622, 92
S. W. (2d) 640.
Ex parte Ashcraft, 193 Mo. App. 486, 186
s. w. 532.
State ex rel. Buckley v. Thompson., 19 S.
W. (2d) 714~
State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo.
252, 48 S. W. (2d) 891.
State ex rel. Burnett v. School District of
the City of Jefferson, 335 Mo. 803,
812-813, 74 S. W. (2d) 30.
Relator cites (page 52 of Brief) Maddox v.
Neal,, 45 Ark. 121, in support of his contention on
the burden .of proof. In point of fact the Maddox
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case does not involve any such question. It is interesting to note, however, that the Maddox case
in an authority squarely opposed to another of relator's contentions. At page 125 of that opinion
the court said:
"The separate education of the two races
in accordance with the terms and spirit of the
law is no wrong to either party. In the absence of express legislation on the subject, the
directors might have provided for this under
their general powers (Union Co. v~ Robinson,
27 Ark. 116; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 504; Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198; Ward v. Flood, 48
Calif. 36; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198) ."
For the reasons above presented we respectfully submit that by the Lincoln University Act,
as amended, relator is given equal protection; and
that, independently of the question of discretion,
mandamus should be denied as a matter of right.

IV.
Relato,r -has not be·e n denied due process of
law.

Relater rather perfunctorily presents a point
based upon an alleged denial of due process. The
point is clearly without merit.
The respondents' refusal to admit relator as a
student does not deprive relator of his property
without due process of law. The holding to this
effect by this court in its former opinion (342 Mo.
121, 134, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 788-789) is not challenged by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Indeed, the contention based on the ·
.d ue process clause is not even mentioned In the
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opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
(59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232). The point is therefore
foreclosed, and is therefore not now involved.
The cases of Wright v. Board of Education,
295 Mo. 466, 246 S. W. 43, and Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U. S. 60, cited by relator on his contention as
to due process, plainly do not support him. No supporting authority will be found. In point of fact
the due process question is not involved, and has
never been raised, in any reported case involving
separation of races for purposes of education. The
nearest approach to a decision of the point is in
Waugh v. Trustees of the University of Mississippi.,
237 U. S. 589, in which the decision is adverse to
relator's contention.

V.
Mandamus is a discretionary remedy, and not
a writ of right; and under all the circ1unstances of
this case the exercise of a sound judicial discre,t ion
requires that the writ should be denied.
1

1

This court on the farmer hearing decided the
merits adversely. to relater, and therefore did not
find it necessary to consider the question as to the
propriety of granting mandamus.* The majority
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
notes this fact (59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232, 237); and the
dissenting opinion stresses it (59 Sup. Ct. Rep.
232, 238). The question is open for decision now.
The question as to the propriety of the remedy
is a local and not a federal question, the decision
*That question was presented at pages
respondents' brief on former hearing.
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of which by the highest court of the State is not
reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United
States (Farson, Son & Co. v. Bird, 248 U. S. 268,
271; People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U. S. 590,
592; Yesler v. Washington Harbor Line Commissioners, 146 U. S. 646, 657).
In addition to the ground for denial of the writ
hereinabove presented (based on the amendment
of Section 9618, R. S., 1929), there is an additional
and independent ground sufficient to justify denial.
Mandamus is a discretionary writ, not a writ grantable as a matter of right; and under all the circumstances of this case the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion requires that the writ be denied.
In State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Th-a tcher, 338
Mo. 622, 627, 92 S. W. (2d) 640, 643, this court
en bane recently dealt with the essential conditions
which must be shown to exist before mandamus
will be awarded, and in that connection said:
''More than that, even though a clear legal
right has been established, the court must look
to the large public interest concerned and should
act in view of all existing facts and with due
regard to the consequences which might result.
This is true especially where, as here, the writ,
if granted, would affect others not party to
the suit, and where questions of grave importance are involved, or where the result might
bring about confusion and disorder, or be unreasonable or injurious to the public; and in
such cases the court should deny the writ, irrespective of the question of clear legal right
of relator."
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In State ex rel. Crow v. Boonville Br'idge Co.,
206 Mo. 74, 134-135, this court en bane said in referring to the remedy of mandamus:
"But whether it be called a prerogative
writ, a writ of right, or an ordinary action at
law, the authorities agree that the courts have
a discretion whether they will issue or refuse
the writ, even where a prim,a jaeie r·ight thereto
is shown. Though there be no other remedy,
the court will still exercise its discretion on
the subject."
In the same case this court quoted with approval
from High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies ( 3rd
Ed.) , ·section 9, as follows:
"Cases may therefore arise where the applicant for relief has an undoubted legal right,.
for which mandamus is the appropriate remedy, but where the court may, in the exercise
of a wise judicial discretion, still refuse the·
relief."'

In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Kansas
City, St. Joseph and c ·o·u ncil Bluffs R. R .. Co .., 77
Mo. 143, 147, this court said:
"If such were the conceded law, whether
a court would by mandamus compel a party
to discharge such an obligation is by no means·
clear·. 'Cases may arise where the applicant
for relief has an undoubted legal right for
which mandamus is the. proper remedy, but
where the court may, in the exercise of a wise
judicial discretion, still refuse the relief.' High
on Extraordinary Remedies, ·Section 9."'

In State ex inf. Barker v .. Kansas City Gas
Co., 254 Mo. 515, 531, this court en bane said:
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''In the next place (still further by way of
a generalizatio n) it is uniformly held that a
writ of mandamus, though it has somewhat
lost its sometime high prerogative quality and
sanction, is yet in so far forth a discretionary
writ that it should be denied if a sound (that
is, judicial) discretion bespeaks that course
(State ex rel. v. Gibson, 187 Mo. 1. c. 555 et
seq.; State ex rel. v. Bridge Co., 206 Mo. 1. c.
133, and authorities cited, among them those
infra). Such discretion must not be measured
by the yardstick of mere whim, arbitrariness ,
humor, fancy. It must be sound, legal, regular,
quickened and guided by law. Subject to the
limitations th11s foreshadowed , the rule is that
'whether a writ of mandamus shall be issued
is in every case a matter resting largely in the
discretion of the court, and depends upon all
the surrounding facts and circumstance s' (Morawetz, Priv. Corp. (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1134;
High, Ex. Leg. Rem. (3rd Ed.), Sec. 9; Merrill
on Mand., Secs. 64, 67) ."

In the same case this court said further (page 541) :
"Having a discretion in the premises to
go on with an investigation here, to be followed or not by an absolute writ, we exercise
it by refusing to do so and by relegating the
matter to the utilities commission if those interested be advised to take that course."
The same principle is announced in Duncan
Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308, 311, and Arant
v. Lane, 249 U. S. 367, 371. See, also, State ex rel.
Burnett v. School District of City of Jefferson., 335
Mo. 803, 815, 74 S. W. (2d) 30, 34, and State ex
rel. Lyons v. Bank, 174 Mo. App. 589, 593-595.
The relator in this case is not in a position to
appeal to the discretion of this court. It is apparent
.

.
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from the record that the relater is acting merely
as a figurehead for the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, in the campaign of that association to force commingling of
the white and negro races in the universities of
those states where race separation obtains. Instead
of this being the case of a negro citizen desiring in
good faith to obtain a legal education, it is rather
the case of a nominal plaintiff acting in aid of an
organized movement to force social equality of the
races in Missouri.
The relator admits that when he applied for
admission in the University of Missouri he knew it
to be the public policy of the state to separate the
white and negro races for the purposes of higher
education, and that the University of Missouri had
been established for whites and Lincoln University
for negroes (81-82). He admits that when he was
advised by President Florence of the provisions
made for his benefit by the then existing Lincoln
University Act, and was offered aid thereunder, he
refused to avail himself thereof (74, 82, 83, 84);
and that he immediately reported to counsel for
the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (82, 84), who at once advised him
to refuse to avail himself of the rights provided for
him by the Lincoln University Act, and to "keep
on corresponding with Missouri University" (84).
It is obvious that counsel for the association were
simply building a case, and were using relater as
a nominal plaintiff . in the attempt to break down
the established public policy of this ·state.
Relater at the trial professed to have made some
investigation of the respective merits of the law
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courses offered at the Missouri University, Iowa
University and Illinois University (86), and he testified that "after comparing the catalogs, or rather
the courses of studies offered, I decided that Missouri U. would give me more largely what I wanted
than any other colleges under consideration " (59).
Yet he admitted that at the time he made this
election he knew nothing whatever as to the system
of instruction at any of these schools, whether they
used the casebook system, the textbook system, the
lecture system or what system (86-87).
In his corresponden ce with the registrar of the
University of Missouri the relator (knowing that
negroes were not admitted there) intentionally concealed the fact that he was a negro. The registrar
wrote relator to have the registrar of his former
school transmit an official transcript of his credits
(63). In relator's reply he says (withholding the
name of his college) :
"I am writing my college registr,ar today
to mail you a copy of my transcript in order
that I might enter the M. U. Law School" (64).
In this instance it is plain that relater was carrying
out a plan of ambush, and was intentionally concealing the name of his college (Lincoln University)
in order to keep the registrar of the University of
Missouri in the dark, as to relator being a negro,
as long as possible. This with the obvious hope
that the registrar in further corresponden ce might
make statements which relator and the national
association counsel might use as evidence.
A most significant piece of testimony by relator, bearing on the question of his good faith,
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appear s at page 88 of the record , where relator
testifie d:
"Q. At page 69 of your deposi tion, do you recall my asking you if a good law school were
establi shed at Lincol n Unive rsity, one that
would be on a par with that at Missou ri University , wheth er you would attend it, and you
refuse d to answe r-didn 't you?
. ,,
A . Y es, sir.
The record shows that relater had refuse d to answer this reason able questio n by instruc tion of the
associa tion's counse l, who repres ented him (88).
This clearly shows that the relator was not interested at all in obtain ing a legal educat ion at Lincoln Univer sity, and was only interes ted in lendin g
himsel f to the nation al associa tion's movem ent to
force the admiss ion of negroe s as studen ts in the
Univer sity of Missou ri. It is imposs ible to reach
any other conclu sion.
The Yale Law Journa l for May, 1936, pages
1298-1299', makes it clear that this Gaines case, and
simila r cases in Maryla nd, North Caroli na and Tennessee , have been prosec uted by the nation al associati on as part of a genera l campa ign.

In the magaz ine "Time " for Decem ber 26, 1938,
at page 20, Walter White, Secret ary of the Nation al
Associ ation for the Advan cemen t of Colore d People ,
made a public statem ent regard ing the decisio n of
the Suprem e Court of the United States in this
case.. It is there said:
"Mean while Walte r White ; secreta ry of the
Nation al Associ ation for the Advan cemen t of
Colore d People,. which financ ed the Gaines test
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case, declared the decision was more sweeping
than he had hoped. To, negroes it means jar
more than a chance to go to professional school.''
This is not a case where relator, acting of his
own free will, is seeking relief for an actual grievance. We would find no fault with the national
association (and would commend it) for rendering
legal aid to any negro so situated. We do, however, question the wisdom of the association in inciting litigation attacking long-established traditions based upon settled law, in states where the
association is not familiar with prevailing conditions. The associatio11 is apt to do more harm
than good to members of the negro race by using
them in what is nothing more or less than a struggle
for social equality. Social equality is something
which cannot be enforced by law, as the courts have
held.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 551.
People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y.
438, 448.
State ex rel. Weaver v. Trustees of Ohio
State University, 126 Ohio St. 290,
297.
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 551-2.
Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 311-312.
Martin v. Board of Education, (W. Va.) 26
S. E. 348, 349.
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 210.
Ward v. Flood, 48 Calif. 36.
The record shows that Missouri is a pioneer
among the states 'in the field .of higher education
for negroes, and is the only state in the Union
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,·vhich has established a separate university for
negroes on the same basis as the state university
for white students (138). If relator, or the association for which he is acting, had felt the slightest
appreciation of this fact, it is fairly to be presumed that relator would at least have applied to
the curators of Lincoln University to see what facilities they would make available for him under the
then existing law. Yet, acting on the advice of the
association's counsel, relator deliberately refused to
do this (74, 82, 83, 84, 85-86). Instead of proceeding in a rational way to take advantage of the
rights provided for him by the state, we find relator
cooperating with the national association counsel in defiance of the recognized right of the state
to separate the races for the purpose of higher education (82, 84). These counsel, his present counsel, advised him to refuse to apply to Lincoln University, and to "keep on correspon,d ing with Missouri University" (84). Obviol1sly, counsel was
merely building evidence for this lawsuit .
We submit that the relator's good faith is open
to serious question, that he is in no position
to appeal to the discretion of this court, and that
in light of all the circumstances this court in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion should deny
mandamus, even if the Lincoln University Act
had not been amended. Of course, the amendment of that act, so as to provide for relator the
opportunity for legal education within the State,
is all the stronger reason (we submit it is a conclusive reason) why the court in the exercise of a ·
sound discretion should deny the writ~

55

In Conclusion.
By the Lincoln University Act, as amended, the
General Assembly of Missouri has set up a complete and exclusive scheme and plan for the higher
education of those negroes of the State who desire
it. Under this plan provision is made for the establishment of new departments in Lincoln University, including a law department. Appropriation of sufficient money is being made for that
purpose. The amendment of tl1e Lincoln University Act has fully complied with the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in this case.
So, as the matter now stands, the relator may
at the State's expense receive a legal education in
Lincoln University, on a par with that available to
white students in the University of Missouri.
The question whether the white and negro
races shall be separated for purposes of higher education, and the determination as to which schools
shall be open to whites and which shall be open
to negroes, are matters within the jurisdiction of
the law-making branch of the state government.
Those matters have been delegated to that branch
by the constitution of the State. The system established by the legislature represents the settled policy of the people of this State.
It is a reasonable certainty that the admission of negroes into the University of Missouri
would create a great amount of trouble, and would
make it very difficult to maintain discipline among
the white students of that institution (177).
The tradition of race separation, which runs through
a hundred years of the history of the university,
is a matter of common knowledge.
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The people of the State believe race separation
to be a wise policy. Experience has shown it to
be a wise policy. This policy of separate education
has preserved order and discipline in the educational system. It has resulted in a steady advance
in the education of each race. It has been established at an expenditure of millions of dollars.
The relator asks this court by the issuance of
a writ of mandamus to undo all this, and to overthrow the system of separate education now provided.
It is our position, respectfully submitted, that
if the settled policy of the state in separating the
races is to be changed, it can only be done in the
orderly way; namely, by a repeal of the present
constitutional and statutory provisions requiring
separation of the races, and by the enactment
of new laws providing for a mingling of the two
races in the same classrooms. We submit that
this radical and fundamental change in the law,
public policy and traditions of the state should
not be accomplished by the writ of mandamus.
For the reasons herein submitted we contend
(a) that the Lincoln University Act, as amended,
bars relief to relator as a matter of right; and (b)
that in view of that amendment, and even independently of the amendment, the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion also requires that mandamus should be denied. We respectfully submit
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that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Boone
County should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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